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11 Introduction
As a reaction to increasing competition and bankruptcies,1 banks all over the
world are trying hard to improve the process of loan origination in corporate
banking. Practitioners estimate that improvements in risk management can
decrease credit losses by 20 to 40%.2 Though eﬀort has focused on technical
scoring systems, based e.g. on an automatic analysis of the annual report
or an automatic account analysis3, automatic scoring systems cannot replace
the loan oﬃcer’s experience. Generally, the loan oﬃcer possesses the best
information about the borrowers prospects to repay the loan. Especially in
corporate banking the task of loan evaluation is often compared to corporate
consulting or company evaluation which is too complex to be left up to an
automatic scoring system.4
In view of the loan oﬃcer’s central role in the process of loan origination,
it is rather surprising that ﬁnancial incentives are rare.5 A ﬁxed payment
usually accounts for a large proportion of a loan oﬃcer’s salary.6 If there is a
success related payment at all, it generally varies with some overall measure
of success (e.g. company or division proﬁt) but not with the loan repayment
or failure. Though this may be related ﬁrst to the dilution of responsibility
(and thus to a team production problem), and second to incentives through
career paths, monetary incentives for loan oﬃcers are clearly an interesting
question.
When analyzing the process of loan origination, we focus on the agency
problem between a bank and its loan oﬃcer. Our most important assump-
tions and results can be summarized as follows: ﬁrst, we assume that the
probability to detect bad loans depends on the loan oﬃcer’s unobservable
eﬀort. Second, we introduce limited liability, meaning that the loan oﬃcer’s
wage has to be non-negative in each state of the world.7 Limited liability
1For example in Germany, the number of company failures has tripled since 1990.
2See Wuﬄi and Hunt (1993).
3Contemporary creditworthiness tests still focus on the automatic evaluation of the
annual report. In this context, a multivariate discriminant analysis (employed e.g by
Bayerische Vereinsbank and Deutsche Bank), expert systems (e.g. Commerzbank), and
neural networks (e.g. Chase Manhattan and American Express) are widely used.
4See Elsas and Krahnen (1998), and Ewert and Schenk (1998) for the signiﬁcance
of automatic credit scoring systems in corporate lending. Due to the lower complexity,
scoring systems to evaluate retail customers generally provide better forecasts and often
completely replace the lending oﬃcer. See e.g. Hyndman (1994) and Rusnak (1994)
5This is even more astonishing as anecdotical evidence suggests that loan oﬃcers tend
to overestimate the creditworthiness of the borrowers. See Wuﬄi and Hunt (1993) and
Kohls and Marciwiak (1987)
6See Scheepens (1995) and Siegel and Degener (1988)
7Alternatively, limited liability can be modeled by introducing a lower limit for the
2aggravates the moral hazard problem and leads to an information rent and
an eﬀort below the ﬁrst best level. Third, we assume that the loan oﬃcer
truthfully reports the result of her check only if this is in her self-interest. We
demonstrate that this truth-telling problem reduces the bank’s expected rev-
enue if and only if the loan oﬃcer can not only conceal that she has detected
a bad loan, but also pretend that the loan is bad when its actually good.8
Fourth and most importantly, we assume that the bank gets an additional
signal from a scoring system, for instance by carrying out a multivariate dis-
criminant analysis (MDA). The question that we are most interested in is
whether the bank should commit itself to reveal the signal to the loan of-
ﬁcer or not. On the one hand, informing the loan oﬃcer about the signal
is favorable because it is then possible to implement diﬀerent eﬀorts for dif-
ferent signals. On the other hand, private information about the result of
the scoring system allows the bank to reduce the loan oﬃcer’s information
rent. We demonstrate that it cannot be said generally which alternative is
preferred by the bank, and we consider the comparative static with respect
to the informativeness of the scoring system.
From a theoretical point of view, we consider a model with hidden action
and limited liability where the risk neutral agent gets private information
(about the prospective borrower’s type) after contracting with the principal,
and after having chosen her eﬀort. Since the principal’s decision depends on
the agent’s private information, the problem of truth-telling arises. More-
over, we assume that the principal has private information (resulting from the
scoring system) and decides whether to reveal the information or not. Innes
(1990) and Park (1995) also consider models with hidden action and limited
liability, but they neither analyze the truth-telling problem nor private in-
formation on the principal’s side. In the models by Demski, Sappington and
Spiller (1988), and Lawarr´ ee and van Audenrode (1996), the agent gets pri-
vate information before choosing her eﬀort, whereas in our model the agent
is not better informed when choosing her eﬀort.9
Our model is most closely related to the two models on delegated ex-
pertise and on the timing of information release by Demski and Sappington
agent’s utility instead of the payments to her. This can lead to substantially diﬀerent
results, see e.g. Demougin and Garvie (1991).
8This is an important diﬀererence to the literature on accountant’s liability (see e.g.
Chan and Pae (1996), and Ewert (1998)), where the agent can only conceal bad types.
This is appropriate since an accountant cannot convey a mistake in a ﬁrm’s statement
that does not exist. In the context of loan origination, however, both types of false reports
must be taken into account.
9See Sobel (1993) for a comparison of models with hidden information before and after
the eﬀort choice.
3(1987) resp. Demski and Sappington (1986).10 They consider a situation
where a principal (for instance a patient) delegates a decision to an expert
(for instance a doctor) whose private information depends on her unobserv-
able eﬀort. Since we assume that the bank follows the loan oﬃcer’s recom-
mendation, she actually delegates the decision.11 However, our model diﬀers
from Demskis’ and Sappingtons’ (DS) at least in three respects: ﬁrst, in
their discrete models they do not characterize the optimal contract. Sec-
ond, the agent is not liability constraint but risk averse. Third, though DS
(1986) deals as well with the question of revealing or concealing the princi-
pal´s private information, none of their ﬁve ”observations” shows the link
between this question and the quality of the principal´s signal which is cen-
tral in our paper. The last point relates our model to the literature on
Informed Principals, for instance to Maskin and Tirole (1990), Maskin and
Tirole (1992), and Beaudry (1994), since the result of the scoring system is
private information to the principal. However, Maskin and Tirole consider
an adverse selection problem, because the agent learns her type before con-
tracting. Though Beaudry considers a moral hazard situation, the agent has
no private information, and the principal cannot credibly reveal her informa-
tion, whereas we analyze whether revelation is favorable or not. Finally, we
are not aware of papers analyzing a loan oﬃcer’s incentives in a comparable
framework. Scheepens (1995) also considers an agency problem between a
bank and its loan oﬃcer, but he focuses on the problem of collusion based
on quite diﬀerent assumptions.
Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, we consider the basic case
where the bank has no private information. Section 4 introduces bank’s
private information and analyzes whether the information should be revealed
or not. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There are two types of potential borrowers demanding bank loans of size I:
”good” types with probability q, and ”bad” types with probability 1−q. The
probability that good loans are repaid is p, with probability 1−p even good
loans fail completely. Bad loans are lost with certainty. Since we consider
10See Lewis and Sappington (1997) for a similar model with focus on a cost reduction
problem.
11To avoid misunderstandings, we wish to emphasize that our truth-telling problem
is not related to the revelation principle, because the principal’s utility depends on the
agent’s eﬀort, and the agent learns the prospective borrower’s type after having chosen
her eﬀort.
4only the behavior of a single risk-neutral bank, we assume that the interest
rate is exogenously given by r. We assume that
qp(1 + r)I − I ≥ 0 (1)
so that granting a loan it is ex ante favorable. The bank can hire a risk-
neutral loan oﬃcer, whose unobservable eﬀort a depends on the probability π
that a bad type is identiﬁed. We assume a(π) = 0 if π = 0, ∂a
∂π > 0, ∂2a
∂π2 > 0,
and limπ→1(a(π)) = ∞.12 Social welfare is
W(π) = qprI − (1 − p)I − (1 − q)(1 − π)I − a(π) (2)
yielding the FOC
(1 − q)I =
∂a
∂πf (3)
for the loan oﬃcer’s optimal detection probability. However, the ﬁrst
best is not attainable through a simple franchising contract because the wage
scheme is assumed to be restricted by the loan oﬃcer’s limited liability. Par-
ticularly, we stipulate that the loan oﬃcer’s wage must be non-negative in
each state of the world.
Besides the unobservability of the loan oﬃcer’s eﬀort, there is an addi-
tional information problem, since the loan oﬃcer might lie. She cannot only
conceal bad types, but can also pretend to have detected bad types.
The basic game can be summarized as follows:
1. The bank oﬀers a contract to the loan oﬃcer specifying a wage for each
state of the world.
2. The loan oﬃcer accepts or not.
3. The loan oﬃcer chooses her detection probability π (and thus her eﬀort
a(π)).
4. The loan oﬃcer reports a type.
5. The bank grants the loan if the loan oﬃcer reports the loan applicant
to be good and rejects the loan if the loan oﬃcer’s report classiﬁes the
prospective borrower as bad.13
6. The loan is paid back or fails, and the wage contract is enforced.
12Of course, we could use the inverse function π(a) instead.
13Otherwise it would be senseless to employ a loan oﬃcer. However, this is not neces-
sarily true if the bank gets an additional signal, see section 4 below.
53 The basic case
Assume ﬁrst that the bank has no additional signal about the borrower’s
type. Since the bank grants a loan if and only if the loan oﬃcer reports a
good type, the contract can consist of three diﬀerent wages. Let Lb be the
wage if the loan oﬃcer reports a bad type, L0
g the wage if she reports a good
type and the project fails, and L1
g if she reports a good type and the project
is successful. Due to the limited liability constraint, L0
g ≥ 0, L1
g ≥ 0, and
Lb ≥ 0. The loan oﬃcer’s reservation level of utility is normalized to zero.
3.1 The pure moral hazard problem
Suppose for the moment that the loan oﬃcer is honest and reports his ﬁndings
truthfully. Her objective function is then14
U(π
m) = qpL
1
g +q(1−p)L
0
g +(1−q)(1 − π
m)L
0
g +(1−q)π
mLb−a(π
m) (4)
yielding the FOC
(1 − q)(Lb − L
0
g) =
∂a
∂πm (5)
The bank’s maximization problem is thus
R(π
m) = qp(rI − L
1
g) − q(1 − p)(I + L
0
g) (6)
−(1 − q)(1 − π)(I + L
0
g) − (1 − q)πLb
subject to the incentive constraint given by Eqn. 5, the limited liability
constraints and the loan oﬃcer’s participation constraint (i.e. U(πm) must
not be negative). Since the loan oﬃcer’s eﬀort is decreasing in L0
g, and
since L1
g has no inﬂuence on her eﬀort, one can immediately conclude that
L1
g = L0
g = 0. Substituting Eqn. 5 into the bank’s objective function leads
to15
R(π
m) = qprI − q(1 − p)I − (1 − q)(1 − π
m)I − π
m ∂a
∂πm → Max! (7)
14”πm” denotes the detection probability in the pure moral hazard case.
15Note that the loan oﬃcer’s participation constraint is not binding, since the marginal
eﬀort is increasing in π, while the expected marginal wage is constant in π. Thus, total
expected wages are always higher than total eﬀort.
6with the FOC
(1 − q)I =
∂a
∂πm + π
m ∂2a
(∂πm)2 (8)
Eqn. 8 shows that the probability of detecting bad loans in the moral
hazard case is smaller than the ﬁrst best probability (πm < πf), because
π ∂2a
∂π2 > 0. This is due to the limited liability constraint, since the ﬁrst best
would otherwise be achievable through a franchising contract as in Harris
and Ravis (1979), and Holmstr¨ om (1979), which grants the complete output
to the agent except for a ﬁxed fee. Since the principal equates the marginal
information rent with the marginal eﬃciency loss, she prefers to implement
an eﬀort below the ﬁrst best level.
3.2 The combined problem
Next we add the problem of truth-telling and assume that the loan oﬃcer
reports his ﬁndings opportunistically. There are two constraints that have
to be taken into account: The ﬁrst constraint ensures that the loan oﬃcer
honestly reveals a bad loan, and is given by
Lb ≥ L
0
g (9)
Second, to ensure that the loan oﬃcer truthfully reports good types,16
q
1 − πc(1 − q)

pL
1
g + (1 − p)L
0
g

+
 
1 −
q
1 − πc(1 − q)
!
L
0
g ≥ Lb (10)
must hold.
q
1−πc(1−q) is the ex post probability that a loan is good if the
oﬃcer did not detect a bad type. pL1
g+(1−p)L0
g is her expected wage in this
case, and if the type is bad she receives L0
g. Summing up yields her expected
wage if she truthfully reports a good type, which must not be smaller than
Lb.
Again, one can immediately conclude that L0
g = 0, because L0
g reduces
the loan oﬃcer’s incentive along Eqn. 5, whereas L0
g can be substituted by
L1
g to fulﬁll the second truth-telling constraint (Ineq. 10). Thus, the ﬁrst
truth-telling constraint is not binding. Conversely, the second truth-telling
constraint is binding, since L1
g does not inﬂuence the loan oﬃcer’s eﬀort, and
is thus chosen as to guarantee that the loan oﬃcer reports truthfully. Setting
L0
g = 0, and substituting the FOC (Eqn. 5) and the remaining truth-telling
constraint (Ineq. 10) into the bank’s objective function (Eqn. 6) leads to
16”πc” denotes the detection probability in the combined problem.
7R = qprI −
∂a
∂πc
(1 − q)
− q(1 − p)I − (1 − q)(1 − π
c)I (11)
with the FOC
(1 − q)I =
∂2a
(∂πc)2
1 − q
(12)
Comparing πc (Eqn. 12) to the detection probability πm (Eqn. 8) shows
that the loan oﬃcer’s eﬀort is smaller in the combined problem if and only if
∂2a
(∂πc)2
1 − q
>
∂a
∂πm + π
m ∂2a
(∂πm)2 (13)
for πc = πm. Though it seems to be natural that the additional constraint
reduces the eﬀort, the result is ambiguous. For instance, for a(π) = 1
(1−π)n−1,
it can easily be shown that πc < πm always holds. However, for a(π) =
tan(b π
2π),17 it is possible that πc > πm if q is suﬃciently high. The reason for
the ambiguousness is the following: The diﬀerence between the pure moral
hazard problem and the combined problem is that L1
g > 0 in the combined
problem. But
∂L1
g
∂Lb is ambiguous in the combined problem, which can be seen
from the truth-telling constraint (see Ineq. 10): for given πc, the higher
Lb, the higher the L1
g required to ensure truth-telling. But since πc (and
thus
q
1−πc(1−q)) is increasing in Lb , the overall eﬀect is ambiguous. In other
words: the higher Lb, the higher πc, and the higher πc, the higher is the ex
post probability that the loan is good if the oﬃcer did not detect a bad type.
This increases her incentive to reveal a good type.
Though the eﬀect of the truth-telling constraint on π is ambiguous, the
bank’s expected proﬁt is clearly decreasing due to the additional constraint.
Proposition 1: In the combined problem, the bank’s expected revenue
is strictly smaller than in the pure moral hazard case.
Proof : A feasible contract in the pure moral hazard problem is to set
Lb(c) and L1
g(c) as in the combined problem. Her expected proﬁt would then
be the same as in the combined problem. Denote this proﬁt in the pure moral
hazard problem as Rm = Rc. Now let Lb(c) in the pure moral hazard problem
again be the same as in the combined problem, but set L1
g = 0. Denote the
bank’s proﬁt in this case as e Rm. Since L1
g does not inﬂuence the loan oﬃcer’s
eﬀort, and since the expected proﬁt is decreasing in L1
g for constant π, we
have e Rm > Rm = Rc. And since πm as given by Eqn.8 maximizes the proﬁt
in the pure moral hazard case, it follows that R(πm) ≥ e Rm > Rm = Rc.
17Since π is the loan oﬃcer’s detection probability, we deﬁne b π ∼ 3.14.
84 The case with an additional signal
Now we assume that the bank gets an additional signal about the borrower’s
type. Let x be the probability to receive a good signal if the loan is good, and
y if the loan is actually bad. Let x > y. Since q is the ex ante probability for
good loans, the probability for a type-I-error is (1 − q)y and the probability
for a type-II-error is q(1 − x) as shown by ﬁgure 1.
Insert ﬁgure 1 here.
Note that the ex ante probability to receive a good signal is g = qx+(1−
q)y .
Because the bank’s decision depends on ex post probabilities for good
and bad loans if a signal is received, we deﬁne
q
g =
qx
qx + (1 − q)y
and
q
b =
q(1 − x)
q(1 − x) + (1 − q)(1 − x)
as ex post probabilities for good loans if a good (bad) signal is received.
Note that
gq
g + (1 − g)q
b = q (14)
because the probabilities to meet good types, weighed with the probabil-
ities for good and bad signals, must add up to the original probability for
good types. It follows qg > q > qb. The question we are interested in is
whether the bank prefers to reveal her private information to the loan oﬃcer
or not. Thus we have to consider two diﬀerent submodels.
4.1 Strategy A: Informed loan oﬃcer
First we assume that the bank commits itself to revealing the signal when
oﬀering an incentive scheme to the loan oﬃcer (i.e. the loan oﬃcer knows the
realization of the signal when choosing her eﬀort). The advantage of revealing
the signal is the possibility to oﬀer diﬀerent contracts in diﬀerent states.
Thus, we have two subgames (one for each signal) with the same structure
as the basic game considered in section 3.2 - the only diﬀerence is that the
probabilities for good types and bad types are diﬀerent (qg or qb instead of
q). To keep the analysis tractable, we add the following Assumption:
Assumption 1: It is always favorable to employ the loan oﬃcer.
9Assumption 1 implies that qg is not too close to 1 (otherwise it would
be favorable to directly grant a loan) and that qb is not too close to zero
(otherwise it would be favorable to directly refuse).
Because L0
g = 0 in the optimal contract, the bank’s objective function
becomes18
R(π
g,π
b) = gR(π
g) + (1 − g)R(π
b) (15)
= A − gq
gpL
1
g(g) − g(1 − q
g)(1 − π
g)I
−g(1 − q
g)π
gLb(g) − (1 − g)L
1
g(b)
−(1 − g)(1 − q
b)

1 − π
b

I − g(1 − q
b)π
bLb(g)
where
A = qI(p(1 + r) − 1) (16)
cannot be inﬂuenced by the bank. Analogously to section 3.2, substituting
the loan oﬃcer’s FOC and the binding truth-telling constraint into the bank’s
objective function leads to
R(π
g,π
b) = A − g
∂a
∂πg
(1 − e qg)
− g(1 − q
g)(1 − π
g)I (17)
−(1 − g)
∂a
∂πb
(1 − qb)
− (1 − g)(1 − q
b)

1 − π
b

I
with the FOC’s
(1 − q
g)I =
∂2a
(∂πg)2
1 − qg (18)
and
(1 − q
b)I =
∂2a
(∂πb)2
1 − qb (19)
Since 1 − qg < 1 − q < 1 − qg, we obtain πg < πc < πb, i.e. the eﬀort
is higher with a bad signal. Interestingly, it can generally not be said that
the bank’s expected proﬁt is higher compared to the case without additional
signal whenever one of the two signals is informative (i.e. if qg > q or
qb < q). More precisely, this is only the case if ∂2R
∂q2 > 0. The deeper reason is
18πg and πb are the eﬀorts with a good signal and a bad signal, respectively.
10that an increase in the percentage of good types (i.e. an increasing q) does
not necessarily increase the bank’s expected proﬁt (i.e. even ∂R
∂q < 0 might
hold)!19 This follows from the fact that an increasing q decreases the loan
oﬃcer’s probability of detecting bad types, thus decreasing her incentive to
work, and this eﬀect might outweigh the better chance to meet good types.
4.2 Strategy B: Uninformed loan oﬃcer
Now we assume that the bank decides to not reveal the signal to the loan of-
ﬁcer. Thus it is impossible to implement diﬀerent eﬀorts for diﬀerent signals,
which is an unwarranted consequence. On the other hand, the bank has
private information allowing to reduce the loan oﬃcer’s information rent.
Analogously to section 4.1, we add an assumption allowing to restrict our
attention to the basic case:
Assumption 2: It is favorable to the bank to grant a loan if and only if
the loan oﬃcer reports ”good”.
Assumption 2 excludes a situation where the quality of a bad signal is
extremely high (i.e. qb close to zero) so that the bank would prefer to rely
on the signal and not on the loan oﬃcer’s report.20
The bank’s objective function is then
R(π
i) = A − gq
gpL
1
g(g) − gq
g(1 − p)L
0
g(g) (20)
−g(1 − q
g)

1 − π
i

L
0
g(g) − g(1 − q
g)π
iLb(g)
−(1 − g)q
bpL
1
g(b) − (1 − g)q
b(1 − p)L
0
g(b)
−(1 − g)(1 − q
b)

1 − π
i

L
0
g(b) − (1 − g)(1 − q
b)π
iLb(b)
where A is deﬁned as in section 4.1, πi is the detection probability when
the signal is unobservable to the loan oﬃcer, and the wage scheme L depends
on the signal.
4.2.1 Truth-telling constraints
Since the loan oﬃcer’s wage depends on the signal, she must calculate the
ex post probabilities for good and bad signals as a function of the result of
her test. Let
19Proof available on request.
20Clearly the bank will always relie on the loan oﬃcer if she claims to have detected a
bad applicant as in our model the type-II-error is excluded.
11g =
g(1 − qg)πi
g(1 − qg)πi + (1 − g)(1 − qb)πi =
g(1 − qg)
1 − q
(21)
be the ex post probability for a good signal if she detected a bad type, and
let 1− g be the ex post probability for a bad signal if she found a mistake.
As to guarantee that the loan oﬃcer truthfully reports bad types,
gLb(g) + (1 − g)Lb(b) ≥ gL
0
g(g) + (1 − g)L
0
g(b) (22)
must be fulﬁlled, where the wage depends not only on whether the loan
is paid back, but also on the result of the scoring system.
To calculate the condition required that the loan oﬃcer truthfully reports
a good test, let21
d = q + (1 − q)(1 − π
i) (23)
the ex ante probability that no mistake is found. If the loan oﬃcer hon-
estly reports, there are six diﬀerent probabilities that she has to take into
account:
1. The signal was good, the type is good and the loan is paid back: g1
g =
gqgp/d
2. The signal was good, the type is good, but the project fails: g0
g =
gqg(1 − p)/d.
3. The signal was good, but the type is bad: gb = g(1 − qg)(1 − πi)/d.
4. The signal was bad, the type is good and the loan is paid back: b
1
g =
(1 − g)qbp/d.
5. The signal was bad, the type is good, but the project fails: b
0
g = (1 −
g)qb(1 − p)/d.
6. The signal was bad and the type is bad: bb = (1−g)(1−qb)(1−πi)/d
If she always claims to having detected a bad type, there are only two
cases that she has to consider:
1. The signal was good: b g =
gqg+g(1−qg)(1−πi)
d .
21Note that the probability can be expressed by q (and thus qg and qb can be neglected),
because the signal must be unbiased.
122. The signal was bad: b b =
(1−g)qb+(1−g)(1−qb)(1−πi)
d .
Thus, the second truth-telling constraint can be written as
L
1
g(g)g
1
g + L
0
g(g)g
0
g + L
0
g(g)gb + L
1
g(b)b
1
g + L
0
g(b)b
0
g + L
0
g(b)bb (24)
≥ Lb(g)b g + Lb(b)b b
4.2.2 Eﬀort constraint
Whereas the truth-telling constraints depend on ex post probabilities for
good and bad signals given the result of the loan oﬃcer’s test, the eﬀort con-
straint depends on ex ante probabilities. The loan oﬃcer’s objective function
yields the FOC
g(1 − q
g)

Lb(g) − L
0
g(g)

+ (1 − g)(1 − q
b)

Lb(b) − L
0
g(b)

=
∂a
∂πi (25)
4.2.3 Analysis
Again, the loan oﬃcer’s eﬀort depends on the diﬀerence between Lb and L0
g,
now weighed with the ex ante probabilities for good and bad signals, and
the probabilities for bad types given the result of the scoring system. Again,
L0
g = 0 in the optimal contract. Thus, the ﬁrst truth-telling constraint (Ineq.
22) can be neglected, and the eﬀort constraint turns out to be
g(1 − q
g)Lb(g) + (1 − g)(1 − q
b)Lb(b) =
∂a
∂πi (26)
Moreover, the second truth-telling constraint (Ineq. 24) becomes
L
1
g(g)g
1
g + L
1
g(b)b
1
g ≥ Lb(g)b g + Lb(b)b b (27)
To deduce the optimal contract, Lemma 1 is required.
Lemma 1: In the optimal contract, the bank sets Lb(g) = 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that the loan oﬃcer gets nothing if she states a bad loan,
whereas the signal indicates a good one. The intuition is that a good signal
increases the probability of a good type, so that it is more likely that the loan
oﬃcer lies if she reported a bad type. Without loss of generality, we stipulate
that the loan oﬃcer also gets nothing if she announces a good type, whereas
13the signal is bad (L1
g(b) = 0).22 Thus, the bank’s maximization problem
becomes
R(π
i) = A − gq
gpL
1
g(g) − g(1 − q
g)

1 − π
i

I (28)
−(1 − g)(1 − q
b)(1 − π
i)I
−(1 − g)(1 − q
b)π
iLb(b)
s.t.
(1 − g)(1 − q
b)Lb(b) =
∂a
∂πi (29)
L
1
g(g)g
1
g = Lb(b)b b (30)
Substituting Eqn. 29 and Eqn. 30 into Eqn. 28, taking into account that
g =
q−qb
qg−qb, 1 − g =
qg−q
qg−qb, and simplifying leads to
R(π
i) = A −
∂a
∂πi
1 − qb −

1 − π
i

(1 − q)I (31)
with the FOC
(1 − q)I =
∂2a
(∂πi)2
1 − qb (32)
Conversely to strategy A, the detection probability implemented by the
wage contract is independent of qg, i.e. independent of the signal’s quality
if it indicates a good type. There are two reasons for this result: First, qg
does not enter into the loan oﬃcer’s ﬁrst order condition (and thus has no
inﬂuence on πi) because the bank sets Lb(g) = 0. Second, the expected wage
required to ensure that the truth-telling constraint is fulﬁlled is also inde-
pendent of qg: Though L1
g(g) can be reduced if the signal’s quality increases,
this eﬀect is equalized by the fact that L1
g(g) must be paid more often if
qg increases. In other words: for a given right hand in the loan oﬃcer’s
truth-telling constraint, the left hand gpqgL1
g(g) must remain constant as to
guarantee a truthful report, so that qg and L1
g(g) are substitutes with respect
to the loan oﬃcer’s truth-telling constraint.
22It can easily be shown that L1
g(b) and L1
g(g) are perfect substitutes, so that L1
g(b) = 0
is not restrictive.
144.3 Comparative Statics
Next we analyze whether it is favorable to the bank to reveal the signal. Com-
paring R(πi) and R(πg,πb), it follows immediately that R(πi) > R(πg,πb)
iﬀ23
(1 − q)π
iI −
∂a
∂πi
1 − qb (33)
> g(1 − q
g)π
gI − g
∂a
∂πg
1 − qg + (1 − g)(1 − q
b)π
bI − (1 − g)
∂a
∂πb
1 − qb
Whether Ineq. 33 holds depends on q, qb and qg. Thus we have to
consider diﬀerent regions depending on q, qb and qg. These diﬀerent regions
are expressed by Propositions 2-4.
Proposition 2: Strategy B is superior if ∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π ≥ 2

∂2a
∂π2
2
.
Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition 2 means that, independently of the percentage of good loans,
and independently of the signal’s informativeness, strategy B is superior if
the marginal disutility of eﬀort increases steeply enough. This follows from
the fact that the optimal detection probability decreases if the marginal disu-
tility of eﬀort increases. Thus, the advantage of implementing two diﬀerent
eﬀorts in strategy A becomes less important. Simultaneously, the marginal
information rent increases due to the higher disutility, so that the reduc-
tion in information rent caused by strategy B becomes more valuable. Thus,
concealing the signal pays oﬀ if the disutility of eﬀort rises steeply.
Since ∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π ≥ 2

∂2a
∂π2
2
is suﬃcient for the superiority of strategy B, we
now assume ∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π < 2

∂2a
∂π2
2
.
Proposition 3: There is always a critical b q as to guarantee that strategy
B is superior.
23For the special case a(π) = 1
(1−π)n − 1 it can be shown that Ineq. 33 can simply be
written as (1 − q)πi > g(1 − e qg)πg + (1 − g)(1 − e qb)πb. This means that it is favorable to
conceal the result of the scoring system if the average detection probability implemented
through the optimal contract is higher (i.e. the costs
∂a
∂πi
1−e qb can be neglected), since πg
and πb are weighted with the probabilities of bad loans in case of good and bad signals.
However, this is only true iﬀ
∂
2

π−
∂a
∂π
∂2a
∂π2

∂π2 = 0, which holds for a(π) = 1
(1−π)n − 1. If
∂
2

π−
∂a
∂π
∂2a
∂π2

∂π2 < 0 (this holds for a(π) = tan(b π
2π)), then R(πi) can be higher even if
(1 − q)πi < g(1 − e qg)πg + (1 − g)(1 − e qb)πb
(proof available on request).
15Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition 3 expresses that, independently of the signal’s quality (i.e.
independently of qg and qb), strategy B is always superior if the percentage
of good loans exceeds a critical value. This is so because the optimal eﬀort
decreases in the percentage of good loans, so that it becomes less important
to implement two diﬀerent eﬀorts in strategy A. Clearly, the critical value
of q depends on the other parameters of the model and can become zero,
so that there are constellations where strategy B is always superior even if
∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π < 2

∂2a
∂π2
2
.
Proposition 4: Suppose q < b q. Then, depending on qg and qb, either
strategy A or strategy B can be favorable.
Proof: see Appendix.
Table 1 shows how the superiority of A or B depends on qg and qb if neither
∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π ≥ 2

∂2a
∂π2
2
nor q > b q holds. First, independently of qb, strategy B is
always superior if qg is suﬃciently small. If qg is small, then that the optimal
eﬀort is relatively high even if the bank receives a good signal, so that the
information rent is more important compared to the possibility to implement
diﬀerent eﬀorts. However, if qg increases, strategy A can be superior. This
is the more likely the higher qb is, since the bank’s proﬁt in strategy B is
independent of qb as explained in subsection 4.2.3. Only if qg is high enough,
strategy A is superior if neither ∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π ≥ 2

∂2a
∂π2
2
nor q > b q holds.
Considering Propositions 2-4 together, our results doubt the current prac-
tice of always revealling the signal to the loan oﬃcer. Strategy A can only be
superior if the disutility of eﬀort does not increase to fast, if the percentage
of good loans is relatively small, and if the informativeness of the good signal
is high.
5 Discussion
We analyzed wage contracts for loan oﬃcers in a model with hidden action,
limited liability and truth-telling constraints under the assumption that the
principal has private information. We demonstrated that the truth-telling
problem reduces the bank’s expected proﬁt because the loan oﬃcer cannot
only conceal bad types, but can also falsely report bad types.
The question we were most interested in was whether the bank should
reveal her private information to the agent. We showed that this depends on
the percentage of good loans in the population and on the signal’s informa-
tiveness. Though we had to deﬁne diﬀerent regions for diﬀerent parameters,
we concluded that it might often be favorable to not reveal the signal. This
16contradicts current practice. In this context it should be interesting to see
how the results change if assumptions 1 and 2 are relaxed. In this case it
could be favorable to the bank make the employment of the loan oﬃcer con-
tingent on the signal, i.e. to employ the loan oﬃcer only if the signal is good
or to employ her only if the signal is bad. Concerning strategy B, the bank
might better rely on the signal than rely on the agent if the signal is bad.
One might wish to extend our model in many respects. First, one could
add a type-II-error on the loan oﬃcer’s side (and not only for the scoring sys-
tem). Second, one could distinguish among more than two types of borrowers,
maybe combined with diﬀerent rates of interest when granting a loan. Third,
one could compare a scoring system to other kinds of supervision, namely to
a senior loan oﬃcer. Fourth, and perhaps most interesting, one might wish
to incorporate the process of loan review in the analysis. If the borrower’s
type changes after the loan is granted, the bank must set incentives to not
prolong the loan. However, there arises a trade-oﬀ between ex ante and ex
post incentives - the higher the payment for the detection of bad loans during
time, the higher the ex ante incentive to grant bad loans.
We would like to mention that we also analyzed the situation where it
is not possible to make the loan oﬃcer’s wage contingent on whether the
loan is repaid or not (unobservable resp. incontractible outcome). This
is an important case from a practitioner’s point of view because there are
often many persons involved in the process of loan origination, and the loan
oﬃcer might already work for an other ﬁrm when the project fails.24 In
the pure moral hazard case (see section 3.1), it does not matter whether
the outcome is observable or not, since the wage is always zero if the loan is
granted. If the truth-telling constraint is taken into account and the outcome
is unobservable, then it is no longer possible to employ a loan oﬃcer, because
she will always report a good type (a bad type) if Lb is higher (lower) than
Lg. Even with an additional signal, it is not possible to employ a loan oﬃcer
if the signal is conveyed - depending on the signal, we have two subgames
where the loan oﬃcer again reports ”bad” as long as Lb > Lg. Thus, an
unobservable outcome strengthens the argument that it might often be better
to not inform the loan oﬃcer about the signal, since the signal partially
substitutes the output as a variable in the optimal wage scheme. Along the
lines of the proof to Proposition 1, it is easy to show that the bank’s proﬁt
is lower compared to the case where the contract is contingent on the result
of the project. However, again in accordance with Proposition 1, the eﬀort
decreases if the outcome is unobservable if and only if
∂2a
∂π2
1−qb > ∂a
∂π + πm ∂2a
∂π2.
Appendix
24See Venohr (1996)
17Proof of Lemma 1:
1. Suppose the bank wishes to implement a speciﬁc detection probability
b π. Since Lb(g) and Lb(b) are substitutes in the loan oﬃcer’s objective func-
tion, one can calculate the marginal rate of substitution between Lb(g) and
Lb(b) from the partial derivatives of the loan oﬃcer’s objective function:25
∂U
∂Lb(g)
∂U
∂Lb(b)
=

 


dLb(b)
dLb(g)

 


EC
=
g
1 − g
1 − qg
1 − qb (34)
The marginal rate of substitution between Lb(g) and Lb(b) expresses to
which degree Lb(b) can be decreased if Lb(g) is increased by one unit, and if
the same probability (eﬀort) shall be implemented.
2. Now suppose that the bank increases Lb(g) by one unit and consider
the eﬀect on the right hand of the loan oﬃcer’s truth-telling constraint (see
Ineq. 25). The marginal rate of substitution between Lb(g) and Lb(b) is26
∂R
∂Lb(g)
∂R
∂Lb(b)
=


 

dLb(b)
dLb(g)


 

TC
=
g
1 − g
1 − (1 − qg)πi
1 − (1 − qb)πi (35)
3. Comparing the marginal rates of substitution shows that

 
dLb(b)
dLb(g)

 
EC
<

 
dLb(b)
dLb(g)

 
TC
if and only if qb < qg, which is always fulﬁlled.

 
dLb(b)
dLb(g)

 
EC
<
 

dLb(b)
dLb(g)
 

TC
means that, if the bank wishes to implement some eﬀort e π, it
is always cheaper for her to decrease Lb(g) and to increase Lb(b) according to
the marginal rate of substitution in the eﬀort constraint, since this alleviates
the truth-telling constraint without altering the eﬀort or the bank’s cost.27
Thus, the bank prefers to set Lb(g) = 0.
The proofs of Propositions 2-4 are tedious, because
∂[R(πi)−R(πg,πb)]
∂q as
well as
∂[R(πi)−R(πg,πb)]
∂qb are ambiguous, so that we have to proceed indirectly.
Thus, some parts are only sketched. More detailed calculations are available
on request.
Proof of Proposition 2: Strategy B is always superior if ∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π ≥
2

∂2a
∂π2
2
.
Let R(πg,πb) be the bank’s proﬁt under strategy A, and R(πi) the proﬁt
under strategy B. We proceed in two steps:
25”EC” denotes ”eﬀort constraint”.
26”TC” denotes ”truth-telling constraint.
27Recall that the marginal rate of substitution between Lb(g) and Lb(b) is the same in
the objective functions of the manager and the loan oﬃcer.
18First we show that R(πi) is decreasing in qb, so that R(πi) is minimum if
qb = q. Second we demonstrate that R(πg,πb) is increasing in qb if ∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π ≥
2

∂2a
∂π2
2
. Because R(πg,πb) = R(πi) if qb = q, this proves Proposition 2.
Step 1:
∂R(πi)
∂qb =
∂

Iπi(1 − q) −
∂a
∂πi
1−qb

∂qb =
− ∂a
∂πi
(1 − qb)2 < 0 (36)
Step 2:
∂R(πg,πb)
∂qb =
∂g
∂qbR(π
g) + g
∂R(πg)
∂qb +
∂(1 − g)
∂qb R(π
b) (37)
+(1 − g)
∂R(πb)
∂qb (38)
=
q − qg
(qg − qb)2

R(π
g) − R(π
b)

+
qg − q
qg − qb
∂R(πb)
∂qb
This is positive iﬀ
∂R(πb)
∂qb >
R(πg)−R(πb)
qg−qb , i.e. iﬀ
∂2R(π)
∂q2 < 0.28 Thus we have
to calculate
∂2R(π)
∂q2 . It can be shown that
∂R(π)
∂q
= (pr + p − 1)I +
(1 − π)∂2a
∂π2 − ∂a
∂π
(1 − q)2 (39)
and
∂2R(π)
∂q2 =
1
∂3a
∂π3(1 − q)3

4
 
∂2a
∂π2
!2
− 2
∂a
∂π
∂3a
∂π3


which is negative iﬀ 2

∂2a
∂π2
2
< ∂a
∂π
∂3a
∂π3.
Proof of Proposition 3: There is always a critical b q guaranteeing that
strategy B is superior.
Deﬁne R(πi) − R(πg,πb) = ∆. In step 1, we show that ∆(qb) has no
maximum. It follows that strategy B is always (i.e. for each qg and qb)
superior to strategy A if ∂∆
∂qb ≤ 0 at qb = q when qg is chosen as to maximize
R(πg,πb). Thus, in step 2, we calculate the critical b q where ∂∆
∂qb = 0 at qb = q.
It remains to be shown in step 3 that ∆ > 0 for each q > b q.
Step 1: Let V denote the variable part of R, i.e.V (πi) = Iπi(1−q)−
∂a
∂πi
1−qb,
V (πg,πb) = gV (πg) + (1 − g)V (πb) = g

Iπg(1 − qg) −
∂a
∂πg
1−qg

28Clearly, π is the optimal detection probability for a given q.
19+(1 − g)

Iπb(1 − qb) −
∂a
∂πb
1−qb

. Then one can show that
∂2∆
(∂qb)2 =
2

∂2a
∂(πi)
2
2
∂3a
∂(πi)
3(1 − qb)3 +
2
1 − qb
∂V (πi)
∂qb
−
2
qg − qb
∂V (πg,πb)
∂qb − (1 − g)
∂V (πb)2
∂(qb)2
If there is an extremum (∂∆
∂qb = 0) then
∂V (πi)
∂qb can be replaced by
∂V (πg,πb)
∂qb .
Thus
∂2∆
∂ (qb)
2 =
2

∂2a
∂(πi)
2
2
∂3a
∂(πi)
3(1 − qb)3 −
qg − q
qg − qb
∂V (πb)
∂qb
−2
1 − qg
(1 − qb)(qg − qb)
 
q − qg
(qg − qb)2
h
V (π
g) − V (π
b)
i
+
qg − q
qg − qb
∂V (πb)
∂qb
!
which can be shown to be positive whenever
∂2V (π)
∂q2 =
∂2R(π)
∂q2 > 0, which
is identical to ∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π3 < 2

∂2a
∂π2
2
. 29
Step 2: Now we are looking for the critical b q where ∂∆
∂qb = 0 at q = qb and
qg = e qg, where e qg is the probability where the bank is indiﬀerent between
employing a loan oﬃcer or not. Tedious calculations yield
∂∆
∂qb |q=qb,qg=e qg=
1
(1 − q)2(e qg − q)
 
(1 − q)
∂a
∂π
− (1 − e q
g)
∂2a
∂π2π
!
Since we know from step 1 that there is no maximum, it follows that
R(πi) > R(πg,πb) for all qg and qb if ∂∆
∂qb = 0 at qb = q and qg = e qg. Thus, b q
is implicitly deﬁned by
(1 − q)∂a
∂π − (1 − e qg)∂2a
∂π2π
1 − q
=
∂a
∂π
− (1 − e q
g)I(1 − q)π = 0
For step 3, we deﬁne ∂a
∂π − (1 − e qg)I(1 − q)π ≡ F
Step 3: First note that F(q) has a root for q = e qg, because then ∂a
∂π =
∂2a
∂π π. We show that F(q) has no maximum to prove that F(q) has not
29Recall that strategy B is always superior if ∂
3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π3 < 2

∂
2a
∂π2
2
is violated.
20more than two roots, and thus that b q is unique if it exists. It follows that
∂∆
∂qb |q=qb,qg=e qg< 0 for each q > b q and therefore ∆ > 0 for each q > b q. From
∂F
∂q
= (q − e q
g)I
2∂2a
∂π2
∂3a
∂π3
+ (1 − e q
g)Iπ
it follows
(1 − e q
g) =
(1 − q)2∂2a
∂π2
2∂2a
∂π2 + π ∂3a
∂π3
for ∂F
∂q = 0. Calculating ∂2F
∂q2 , and substituting (1 − e qg) =
(1−q)2 ∂2a
∂π2
2 ∂2a
∂π2 +π ∂3a
∂π3
into ∂2F
∂q2 , leads to the result that a suﬃcient condition for ∂2F
∂q2 > 0 to hold
(and thus that the extremum of F(q) is a minimum if it exists) is ∂4a
∂π4
∂2a
∂π2 <
3
2

∂3a
∂π3
2
. This is implied by ∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π < 2

∂2a
∂π2
2
(otherwise, strategy B is always
superior, see Proposition 2) if
∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π 
∂2a
∂π2
2 is constant or decreasing in π.30 Thus, b q
is unique if it exists. b q exists iﬀ F(q) ≥ 0 at q = 0, i.e. iﬀ ∂a
∂π −(1− e qg)Iπ ≥ 0.
However, if ∂a
∂π − (1 − e qg)Iπ < 0, then ∆ > 0 always holds (and thus b q = 0).
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose 2

∂2a
∂π2
2
> ∂a
∂π
∂3a
∂π3 and q < b q. Then,
depending on qg and qb, either strategy A or strategy B can be superior.
First we show that there exists a b qg < e qg guaranteeing that, independently
of qb, strategy B is superior (row 1 in table 1) if qg < b qg.
We have to search for a pair (q, b qg) where ∂∆
∂qb = 0 for qb = q. Recalling
that ∂∆
∂qb has no maximum, and taking into account that
∂R(πg,πb)
∂qg > 0, it
follows that strategy B is then superior for qg < b qg.
Deﬁne ∂∆
∂qb |qb=q≡ ∂e ∆
∂qb. It can be shown that ∂e ∆
∂qb = 0 if
(1 − q)
 
π
g ∂2a
∂ (πg)
2 −
∂a
∂πg
!
+ (1 − q
g)
 
∂a
∂π
− I(1 − q)(1 − q
g)π
!
≡ G = 0
Obviously, for the minimum qg (i.e. for qg = q), we have G = 0. For the
maximum qg (i.e. for qg = e qg) it follows G > 0 when taking into account
that q < b q. Moreover, we get
30This must be the case as otherwise
∂3a
∂π3
∂a
∂π  
∂2a
∂π2
2 would at some point become > 2.
21∂G
∂qg = −
∂a
∂π
+ 2I(1 − q)(1 − q
g)(π − π
g)
Thus ∂G
∂qg < 0 if q = qg. Concerning the slope of G(qg), one can now
conclude that G has a root at qg = q, and is decreasing at this point. As
G > 0 for qg = e qg, it follows that G has a second root at qg = b qg < e qg.
Because ∂∆
∂qg < 0, this solution must be unique.
Now assume that qg > b qg. For qb = q−ε, we have∂∆
∂qb < 0 because ∂∆
∂qb = 0
for qb = q and qg = b qg and because ∂2∆
∂qg∂qb > 0.31 Thus, ∆ < 0 in this region.
However, if qb < b qb, then strategy B remains superior, and b qb is implicitly
deﬁned by
Iπ
i(1 − q) −
∂a
∂πi
1 − b qb
= g
 
Iπ
g(1 − q
g) −
∂a
∂πg
1 − qg
!
+ (1 − g)
 
Iπ
b(1 − b q
b) −
∂a
∂πb
1 − b qb
!
If qg exceeds a critical value qg, strategy A becomes superior indepen-
dently of qb (third row in table 1). This is so because ∂2∆
∂qg∂qb > 0, and thus,
increasing qg makes strategy A superior even for smaller qb. The critical qg
is deﬁned by equating R(πi) and R(πg,πb) at qb = 0.
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